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CUMBERLAND GAP.

Its Importance as a Strategic Point
During the War.

MORGAN'S CAMPAIGN.

Organization of the Seventh
Division, Army of the Ohio.

THE STRONGHOLD FALLS.

Skillful Generalship Compels
Its Evacuation.

BY JOHN W. FREY, 42D OHIO, ASHLAND, O.

The discomfiture of Humphrey Marshall by Gen. Garfield in the Big Sandy Valley and the defeat of Gen. Zollicoffer by Gen. Thomas at Mill Spring left the vast army of Gen. Buell free, after the capture of Fort Henry and Donelson, to operate southward, capture the capital of Tennessee, and seize that important Southern highway and artery of communication, the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. In order to execute that important movement without danger of a movement upon Buell's rear from Southeastern Kentucky it became important that the Confederate force at Cumberland Gap should be held in check, or, what would be better still, the Gap captured and that strong gateway from East Tennessee into Kentucky closed. For this special service a new command was organized by order of Gen. Buell, with the designation of "Seventh Division, Army of the Ohio." The order was issued on the 28th of March, 1862, and Brig-Gen. George W. Morgan, of Ohio, a veteran officer, who had been educated at West Point and had fought in the Texas and Mexican wars, was assigned to the command of the new division.

CUMBERLAND GAP, which has been by some denominated the "Gibraltar of America," is situated at the point of junction between Tennessee, Kentucky and Virginia. If you should stand upon the lofty peak that overhangs the notch from the east, you might look



GEN. GEORGE W. MORGAN.

down upon three States and see in the blue, hazy distance the mountain range of Western North Carolina. Cumberland Gap is a deep opening or cleft in the top of the Cumberland range, which for more than a hundred miles forms the boundary line between Virginia and Kentucky. This celebrated mountain pass is 1,000 feet above the valley at either base of the range, and on the east towers a lofty peak 1,000 feet higher. The southern face of the mountain is rough, irregular and precipitous, and is impracticable for military movements. It is impregnable even against the attacks of infantry, except by way of the road, which was constructed many years ago at State expense. The building of the road involved great engineering skill.

During the war Cumberland Gap was a position of much strategic importance, being a great natural stronghold and key to the States of Tennessee, Kentucky and Virginia. The military importance of that "American Gibraltar" was keenly appreciated by both parties to the great controversy. Gen. Braxton Bragg, in one of his official reports, designates the pass as "the gateway to the heart of the Confederacy." That artery of commerce and important line of communication, the railroad which connects Richmond with the Gulf States, passes through the States of Tennessee, Kentucky and Virginia. The advantage to both sides of the possession of that railroad is apparent at a glance to the most casual student of military operations.

Knoxville, then the metropolis of East Tennessee, is 60 miles to the southward of Cumberland Gap. Ninety miles to the south is Pound Gap, the only point in that direction at which an army encumbered with artillery could pass the mountains. Nineteen miles to the westward of Cumberland Gap is Rogers Gap, where the mountain is less rugged and abrupt, and it was known that lightly-laden wagons sometimes passed the mountains at that point. Still westward about 15 miles is Big Creek Gap, a deep fissure in the mountains, opening abruptly from the bed of Big Creek to the crest of the mountain. That defile was obstructed by fallen timber and rocks for a distance of 18 miles northward.

With this description of the situation of Cumberland Gap and its environs, we return to

THE SEVENTH DIVISION, under Gen. Morgan, concentrating at Cumberland Ford. In 1861, Maj.-Gen. Don Carlos Buell was in command of the Army of the Ohio. Toward the close of that year he ordered Brig-Gen. S. P. Carter, of East Tennessee, to occupy Cumberland Ford, 14 miles north of Cumberland Gap. Gen. Car-



MAP OF THE TERRITORY ADJACENT TO CUMBERLAND GAP.

ter's force consisted of six regiments of infantry, one battery of artillery, and a battalion of cavalry. The object of the expedition was, if possible, to wrest the Gap from the enemy, then to occupy the place with a small force; and if that plan were not found feasible, to observe and report operations.

The Seventh Division, as originally organized, comprised four brigades of infantry, composed as follows:

Twenty-fourth Brigade, Brig-Gen. S. P. Carter commanding, composed of the 1st Tenn., Col. R. K. Byrd; 2d Tenn., Col. J. P. T. Carter; 7th Ky., Col. T. S. Garrard; and 49th Ind., Col. James Kaigwin.

Twenty-fifth Brigade, Brig-Gen. Jas. A. Spears commanding; 3d Tenn., Col. L. C. Honck; 4th Tenn., Col. Robert Johnson; 5th Tenn., Col. James T. Shelly; 6th Tenn., Col. James A. Cooper.

Twenty-sixth Brigade, Col. John F. De Courcy commanding; 16th Ohio, Lieut. Col. G. W. Bailey; 23d Ky., Col. D. W. Lindsey; 42d Ohio, Col. L. A. Sheldon.

Twenty-seventh Brigade, Brig-Gen. A. Baird commanding; 33d Ind., Col. John Coburn; 14th Ky., Col. J. C. Cochran; 19th Ky., Col. W. J. Landrum.

Besides the regiments of infantry named, the division contained the 1st Wis. battery of artillery, six 24-pound Parrott guns, Capt. J. T. Foster; 7th Mich. battery, Capt. C. H. Rodman; 9th Ohio battery, two 12-pound howitzers and two 24-pound cannons, Capt. Wetmore; and eight heavy siege guns, commanded by Lieut. Dan Webster. The division contained also a battalion of cavalry, under the command of Col. Mandy, of Kentucky; Capt. W. F. Patterson's Corps of Engineers, and a Signal Corps, under the charge of Lieut. H. G. Fisher, consisting of three officers and 10 men. Gen. Morgan's personal staff were: Capt. Charles O. Johns, Adjutant-General; Lieut. E. D. Saunders, Robert Montgomery and Charles S. Mundy, Aids-de-Camp; Capt. M. C. Barber, Assistant Quartermaster; Capt. Matt Adams, Assistant Commissary; and Capt. Sydney A. Lyon and W. C. Craighill, Engineers. The division had an

AGGREGATE STRENGTH OF 12,500 MEN.

As soon as the roads became passable Gen. Morgan began to concentrate his troops at Cumberland Ford. He reached the ford early in April, 1862, and found Gen. Carter's troops, which were occupying the place, threatened with scurvy, badly clad, and in-



MARCHING UNDER DIFFICULTIES.

differently armed. In the same battalion were found muskets of three or four different calibers. As a consequence the morale and effectiveness of Carter's little force was not first-class. A contract was at once made for beef cattle sufficient for Morgan's entire command, which were delivered and slaughtered twice a week. The arms of various

*In the preparation of these articles I am materially aided by valuable data kindly furnished me by Gen. Morgan.

calibers, which were mingled together with reckless incongruity in the same regiment, were redistributed, and uniformity of caliber in the respective regiments thereby secured, and all munitions were brought to the front.

The maintenance of so large a force, at that season of the year, in a barren and waste country—a wilderness which did not "blossom as the rose"—more than 80 miles from the nearest base of supply, and connected with it by a road barely passable for freight wagons, was an undertaking of more than ordinary magnitude. The organization and victualing of the Seventh Division was in hand, however,



A CAVALRY PICKET.

and the risk and difficulties incident must be encountered and overcome. The Crab Orchard road was at once repaired and put into passable condition, and all possible facilities for transportation were augmented.

The troops were necessarily put upon short rations, but they bore their deprivation bravely and without a murmur, devoting themselves to their duties with soldierly alacrity, and rapidly progressed in the work of organization and discipline. The routine of duty consisted of guard and picket duty; six hours daily of drill, reviews and parades. Twelve miles distant and in distinct view was the great fortress, Cumberland Gap.

There is a barren wilderness comprising an area of 100 miles east, west and north of the Gap, very sparsely inhabited, which is scarcely capable of supplying breadstuff to the few inhabitants within its limits. Gen. Morgan was constrained through force of circumstances to establish a new base of supplies at Lexington. He reached Cumberland Ford in the midst of the rainy season, and the roads were in a terrible condition. It was with the utmost difficulty that a small train of 10 or 12 wagons

MADE FOUR MILES A DAY.

Forage for the mules and horses had to be transported in the same way and over the same route, and loads were restricted to 1,000 pounds per wagon. Gen. Morgan might have mitigated the inconvenience of supplying his entire division at Cumberland Ford by leaving a portion of it in the neighborhood of Lexington until the forward movement was made; but his division was, in the main, composed of raw levies, and he deemed it most urgent and important to concentrate the entire command, so that uniform discipline and drill might be imparted, even at the disadvantageous exchange of comparative ease and comfort for deprivation, hardship and exposure.

The main traveled roads from Lexington and Knoxville meet in Cumberland Gap, and the railroad connecting Richmond with the other insurgent States touches Knoxville and Chattanooga. East Tennessee and the Virginia & East Tennessee Railroad once in the possession of an adequate Federal force, the evacuation of Virginia would have become imperative. The Confederate army, in that event, would have been driven southward or hemmed in by the Federal armies between the mountains and the Atlantic coast. Should East Tennessee have been the theater of active military operations, the Confederate army of

Virginia would have been placed at woful disadvantage between the Federal armies of the Potomac and East Tennessee.

The position of the Confederates in Virginia would thereby have been rendered untenable, as the reader can readily see. East Tennessee constituted a Confederate department, held by Gen. E. Kirby Smith, with a movable force of 18,000 to 20,000 men, with the great gateways to that territory, Chattanooga and Cumberland Gap, in his possession. Gen. Buell left it to the sound discretion of Gen. Morgan, whether he should boldly advance upon Cumberland Gap, or so dispose his force as to closely observe the enemy and hide his time to effect the capture of that rebel stronghold.

Gen. Morgan, after a close and diligent study of the situation, determined to move upon Cumberland Gap, held by Brig-Gen. C. L. Stevenson with a force of 5,000 men, and attempt its capture. He executed two reconnaissances of the enemy's position—one secret and the other armed—which discovered the enemy in such strength as to induce Gen. Morgan to abandon the contemplated attack in front.

THE ENEMY'S POSITION was about as follows: The mountain presented an abrupt and rugged wall of rocks, earth, underbrush and timber, with but meager facilities for wagon transportation. There is a passable wagon road leading through Pound Gap, 90 miles to the eastward; but it was under constant surveillance by the enemy, as was Baptist Gap, north of the mountains and eight miles distant from Cumberland Gap. It would have been very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to effect a passage at either of these Gaps in the face of the determined resistance Morgan would have encountered had he attempted a passage at either point. Besides these there were Big Creek Gap, 25 miles, and Rogers Gap, 35 miles to the westward of Cumberland Gap.

There is but little depression in the mountain at Rogers Gap, and the mountain would have been easier of ascent on the northern and of descent on the western side, had it not been obstructed by fallen timber and huge boulders. The face of the mountain is less rugged and broken than at the other points named. The apology for a road leading through Big Creek Gap followed a deep gorge and was heavily blocked by fallen timber for many miles northward. That route was considered impracticable for the movement of an army with artillery.

Gen. Morgan, in his official report of the capture and occupation of Cumberland Gap, dated at that place, June 22, 1862, says:

It was universally believed that the route through Cumberland Gap was the only one practicable within a range of 90 miles for the movement of an army with munition; and as it was, our horses were frequently without forage and the troops on half rations. To have three days' rations ahead was a subject of rejoicing.

Gen. Morgan sent Spears with his brigade to remove the blockade between the north of Big Creek Gap and Pine Knob, with special instructions to closely observe the enemy; and in the event of his being threatened or attacked by a superior force to fall back upon Cumberland Ford and Barbourville. No sooner had Spears begun to remove the obstructions than Kirby Smith sent Brig-Gen. Barton with a division of troops to the mouth of Big Creek Gap.

Upon learning of the movements and position of Barton, Morgan decided to pass the mountain at Rogers Gap and attack him in front, while Spears was directed to pass the mountain by an ill-defined path called Elk Gap, six miles to the westward of Barton's position, and fall upon his rear and

ATTACK WITH ENERGY

as soon as he heard Morgan's guns. In pursuance of this plan an advance-guard composed of a battalion of cavalry and the 7th Ky. was thrown forward six miles on the Clear Creek road, De Courcy's Brigade following, and advanced to the Moss House, on the road leading toward Rogers Gap, when information was received that Barton had

withdrawn his command from Big Creek to Cumberland Gap. Gen. Spears continued the work of removing the blockade, when Smith, determined to cut him off, advanced from Knoxville with a force numbering nearly 8,000 infantry and a battalion of cavalry toward Woodson's Gap.

When the head of Smith's column reached Clinton, eight miles to the northward of Knoxville, Mrs. Edwards, a brave and loyal woman, one of whose sons was in the Confederate army and another in the Federal army, by a secret path crossed the mountains, and, riding all night, reached Gen. Morgan's headquarters at Cumberland Ford early in the morning, and informed Morgan of Smith's movements. Morgan at once dispatched couriers to Spears, directing him to fall back. Spears' Brigade was promptly withdrawn, and Smith returned discomfited to Knoxville. His prey had eluded him, and he was chagrined and mortified. The generalship of Morgan and the loyal devotion of the East Tennessee woman had been too much for him.

To mask Kirby Smith's advance upon Spears Col. Raines made a feint against Cumberland Ford on the same day on which Smith reached Woodson's Gap. On the 15th of June the advance-guard moved forward, followed on the 16th by the brigade of De Courcy, which had advanced to and occupied the narrow defile at the Moss House. As De Courcy moved out of the defile it was promptly occupied by Baird's Brigade. When Baird in turn moved out the pass was occupied by Carter's Brigade. The mask

WAS COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL.

The head of Morgan's column had marched 40 miles and reached Rogers Gap, at the south side of the mountains, before the enemy detected the plan or had obtained the slightest intimation that Morgan had left Cumberland Ford.

I have always thought, and am still convinced, that a more difficult march than this was never made by any army encumbered with artillery. Eight of the guns were exceedingly heavy; two were 32-pounders and six were 20-pound Parrotts. At some points on the line of march it became necessary to drag them over the Cumberland and Pine Mountains by means of ropes, block and tackle. At other places they were pulled over the precipitous mountain paths by "horse power"—20 horses to the gun—or by 200 men to each piece. It reminded one of Napoleon dragging his cannon over the Alps.

Gen. Spears had almost completed his task of removing the obstructions at Big Creek Gap. The laborious work of getting the artillery and supply train over the mountains determined Morgan to send Gen. Carter to unite with Spears at Big Creek Gap. Carter was directed to advance with Spears along the Valley road, on the north side of the mountains, to the foot of Rogers Gap, a distance of about 15 miles.

At the junction of the Powell's Valley and Knoxville roads is a large and dense forest, in which Gen. Morgan concentrated his little army on the 16th of June. This position was 45 miles to the northward of Knoxville. Clinton, on the Clinch River, was one of the Confederate depots of supplies, and Cumberland Gap was 20 miles to the eastward. Gen. Morgan was now in position to threaten either or all of the points named. On the 15th Morgan received a dispatch from Gen. Spears, inclosing an order taken from an intercepted courier from Col. Carter, of the Confederate cavalry, to Maj. Bean, and dated "Cumberland Gap, June 11, 1862," which read as follows:

MAJOR BEAN: Maintain your position if you possibly can until to-morrow. The General intends sending a force of artillery and infantry down the valley early in the morning to attack the enemy. Gen. Barton's force is on its way back into the valley. Dispatch to Col. Alton immediately the intention of the General to move a force down the valley in the morning, and tell him that Gen. Stevenson wishes him to dispatch to Gen. Barton the same thing immediately. The dispatch should go by way of Clinton, if possible, as Gen. Barton will soon move by that route. This post will not be evacuated; at least not yet.

By command of Lieut.-Col. J. E. Carter.

(Signed) J. D. CARTER, Adjutant.

Kirby Smith had proceeded with his movable force to the relief of Chattanooga. When he reached the Tennessee he learned for the first time that Morgan was crossing the mountains into East Tennessee, and was threatening Knoxville, Cumberland Gap and Clinton—the latter his most important depot of supplies. Just before leaving Cumberland Gap, Morgan, the alert and wily Federal commander, had caused to be circulated a report that he

EXPECTED LARGE REINFORCEMENTS, and that he would pass the mountains immediately upon their arrival. After he entered East Tennessee, the Knoxville papers estimated his force at 50,000 men. The rebel cavalry occupied the valley.

Morgan ordered his supply train to concentrate at Flat Lick, 22 miles from Cumberland Gap, and collected supplies in Powell's Valley, upon which he subsisted his troops. Smith, with all his available force, except the command of Stevenson, at Cumberland Gap, advanced into the big valley south of Powell's River, and Morgan deemed it of the utmost importance to act with promptness and celerity. He did not allow Smith time to concentrate his force for the defense of Cumberland Gap, or to fight him in the field.

A force of the enemy was found in position at Thomas's farm, a point nearly equidistant from Rogers and Cumberland Gaps. It was afterward ascertained to be a force sent out by Smith to make observations. At an early hour on the morning of June 18 Morgan's command, in two columns of two brigades each, with canteens filled with coffee, and a lunch in haversacks, advanced by two parallel roads running from near Rogers Gap and intersecting at Thomas's farm. As the little army advanced the eyes of the soldiers were dazzled by the exquisite and beautiful panorama which opened before them. Away to the east, a blue line on the refulgent horizon, loomed in majestic grandeur the mountains of North Carolina. Under their

feet the Cumberlands, with the clustering foot-hills at their base, trended northeast and southwest; in their rear lay the beautiful hill country of Kentucky, all aglow in the morning sun with a soft gold and purple haze. Before them, dressed in the emerald vestments of the early Summer time, stretched Powell's Valley, with a silver line, which marked the course of Powell's River, meandering through it. It was a scene to inspire admiration and cause the soldiers to forget for the moment, through the poetic beauty which surrounded them, the rude business in which they were engaged.

The movement was made without noise or confusion, and the column halted for breakfast about two miles from the advanced post of the enemy. When about forming his line of battle Morgan learned that the enemy had retired from Thomas's during the night, and that Stevenson was

EVACUATING CUMBERLAND GAP.

This latter information was brought by a soldier named Reynolds, of the 1st Tenn., who by a rugged path had crept along the mountain-tops and cautiously approached Cumberland Gap. He was astonished to see the whole garison in utter confusion, destroying its tents, gun carriages and equipment, and preparing for precipitate flight.

Hurrying back along the dizzy heights the bold mountaineer told his story. Morgan pushed rapidly forward, and the head of the column entered Cumberland Gap only a few hours after the rebel rear-guard had left. In his report of his operations Gen. Morgan says:

The result secured by strategy is less brilliant than a victory gained amidst the storm and hurricane of battle, but humanity has gained all that glory has lost, and I am satisfied.

As showing the high appreciation of this bloodless victory by the Department Commander and the Executive and War Department at Washington I append the following order and message of congratulation:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE OHIO, HUNTSVILLE, ALA., July 12, 1862.

General Orders, No. 22.

The General commanding the Army of the Ohio takes pleasure in announcing the success of an arduous and hazardous campaign by the Seventh Division, Brig-Gen. George W. Morgan commanding, by which the enemy's fortified position at Cumberland Gap was turned and his forces compelled to retreat as our troops advanced to attack. The General commends the gallant conduct of our officers and troops, to whom you will express the thanks of the President and the Department.

With thanks for your diligence and ability, I remain yours, truly,

E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

[To be continued.]

"FOUR CAROLINE."

[As a Grand Army Campfire at Savannah, Tenn., some time ago, one of the most honored guests was "Caroline," an old U. S. Army mule. She was decked with flags, one of which bore the inscription "Here's Yer Mule," and was ridden at the head of the procession, to the speakers' stand, by the oldest soldier present, where the following, contributed by Comrade K. K. Baird, Co. C, 2d Ohio Cav., was sung, to the tune of "Maryland, My Maryland," amidst great applause.]

O hah, all hail to the army mule,

Caroline, old Caroline!

She went through the racket and cool,

Caroline, old Caroline!

Her coat as rough, and her gait as slow

To what it was twenty years ago,

And she bears the marks of many a blow,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

She served her country wet and dry,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

"Till she got 'I. C.' branded on her thigh,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

Then the A. G. M. her rations stopped,

And from the rolls her name was dropped,

And a pile of rotting shoes she limped and hopped,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

Could you but talk, what a tale you could tell,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

Of the murderous work of shot and shell,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

But alas, old friend, you can only brag,

And call for your ration of once a day,

Which you ought to have three times a day,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

I fear, old friend, your rations are out,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

And if you don't look sharp you will go up the

spout,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

For you know full well the hardest of steeds

Can't live exclusively on island weeds,

And this mule is no stronger with your feed,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

Then hail, all hail to the army mule,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

To Caroline, poor Caroline!

Long may she live, long may she wave,

And when she dies, fill an honored grave,

Of one that helped the Union to save,

Caroline, poor Caroline!

A Level Head.

[Omaha World.]

First Omaha Bachelor—I am afraid that beautiful Miss Millon is a little flighty.

Second Omaha Bachelor—On the contrary, she's the most level-headed girl I ever knew.

"Can't see how you got that idea. Last evening she persisted in demanding that I must teach her how to play poker."

"Great Cesar! I hope you didn't do it."

"No, I thoughtlessly told her at first that I did not know how, and after that didn't want to let her know I lied, don't you know?"

"You're saved, my boy. Pop as soon as you wish."

"Guess you are a little wild, too."

"Not a bit of it. She made the same request of me, and after I had laughed her game, she quietly stated that she would never give her hand and fortune to a man who knew how to gamble."

He Saved Her.

[Boston Transcript.]

"Ah, doctor, you here!" murmured Mrs. Ruggles, upon coming to herself after a fainting fit; "I am indebted to you for my life." "Not your life, madame," replied the doctor, with a graceful bow, "but perhaps I have helped you in another way. All the women here declared you had fainted, but with your complexion, madame, the thing was absurd. I therefore insisted that you were rendered unconscious by a rush of blood to the head."

Not a Family Man.

[Laf.]

"Gianna a couple of tickets for the show," said a countryman at the box-office.

"Yes, sir; for the family circle?"

"Sh!" warned the countryman, and then he whispered:

"No, not for the family circle. You see I've only been married 'bout four hours, mister. Just put us in 'mong the young folks."

IN REAR OF VICKSBURG.

Grant's Campaign that Bottled up Pemberton's Army.

CROSSING THE RIVER

Below the City and Driving the Enemy Before Him.

BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.

The First of the Series of Rapidly Succeeding Victories.

BY MAJ. FRANK SWIGART, LOGANSPORT, IND.

Gen. Grant had during the Winter and Spring of 1863 concentrated three army corps at Milliken's Bend, on the west side of the Mississippi River a few miles above Vicksburg: the Thirteenth Corps, under the command of Maj.-Gen. McClernand; the Fifteenth Corps, under Maj.-Gen. Sherman; the Seventeenth Corps, under Maj.-Gen. Phelps. The Third Division of the Thirteenth Corps, the one to which I belonged, was commanded by Maj.-Gen. A. P. Hovey. Portions of all these commands had been kept busy during February and March in attempting to find a practicable water way to the rear of that stronghold from above the town, so that Grant's army could be supplied. All these had failed. He was compelled to choose some other way to reach the city. It was considered certain that the gunboats could pass the batteries at Vicksburg and Warrenton as they had at Island No. 10 and other places. If they could, he could get the means to cross the river below the batteries at some place that would give him high and solid ground to campaign on.

In front of the town the river makes a great bend to the east, then, striking the hills upon which the city stands, it bends to the west, forming a large peninsula of low bottom land intersected by various channels or bayous. These low lands were at this time much overgrown and wet. The roads in many places were submerged by the overflow of the river; bridges were gone or destroyed. In order to make the route practicable at all, much of the road

HAD TO BE CONDEMNED

and many bridges replaced. By almost superhuman efforts all this was accomplished and the peninsula was crossed.

Well do I remember the toils and labors of that march. The lowlands were of such a character that the troops moving over them made the roads a deep, sticky, clinging mud—a kind that possessed great adhesive power, especially when the shoes of the men or wheels of the wagons and artillery carriages came in contact with it. The men's feet would gather such loads of it that it was almost impossible for them to move at all. So it was with the teams. Many of the men were compelled to fall out of the line in consequence of the mud sticking to their shoes, and it was no uncommon thing to see 10 or a dozen wagons stuck in the mud at one time. Such things as these were calculated to provoke the profanity of the men.

In addition to the hard service attendant upon the movement of the troops, on some occasions dry ground sufficient to camp upon



CAPTURING A SCOUT.

could not be found. The men were compelled to sleep on ground that was wet and cold. Yet all these labors and hardships were cheerfully performed and borne by the men. They would sometimes sing and sometimes swear, but never complain.

Thus it went on, day after day, until we reached the river near New Carthage. It was at first intended that we should march to the river at that place, but when near that town it was found that the levee of the Bayou Tidal had either given way because of defects and the great pressure of the water upon it, or it had been destroyed by the rebels, so that our troops could only reach that town by boats. A few were passed over in that way.

This means of transportation did not tally with the energy with which that expedition was to be pushed. A new road

AROUND THE OBSTRUCTION

was found, the line of march changed, and